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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Pendergrass renews his statement of the Nature of the 
Case as set forth in Appellant's Brief filed September 12, 2013. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Pendergrass renews his Statement of Facts and Course of 
Proceedings as set forth in Appellant's Brief filed September 
12, 2013. 
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I I . ARGUMENT 
A. The Magistrate Did Not Make A Sufficient Finding 
That Officer Olson Identified Mr. Pendergrass 
Prior To Initiating The Traffic Stop. 
Mr. Pendergrass does not argue that State v. Cerino 
requires that Officer Olson positively identify him as the 
driver before he may initiate the traffic stop, however Mr. 
Pendergrass does assert that "mere observation of a vehicle 
being driven by someone of the same gender as the unlicensed 
owner is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
unlawful activity." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738, 117 P. 
3d, 876, 878. Here, the testimony presented was that Ofc. Olsen 
learned that Mr. Pendergrass was the registered owner of a 
Toyota truck. 
through p. 
(6/18/12 Tr. p. 10 Ll. 9-14; Tr. p. 16 L. 1 
17 L. 9) Ofc. Olsen also learned that Mr. 
Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended. ( 6 / 1 8 / 12 Tr . p . 
17 Ll. 4-10) Although Ofc. Olson could not remember the traffic 
stop very well he testified that he most likely ran the plate 
and "before he was able to get the driver's license returned" he 
lost sight of Mr. Pendergrass but looked for him for the next 
ten minutes until he found him. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 18 L. 22 though 
p. 19 L. 10) These ten minutes "looking for him" were prior to 
Ofc. Olson seeing a photo of Mr. Pendergrass because the 
driver's license had not returned before he lost sight of the 
truck. ( 6 / 18 / 12 Tr . p . 19 Ll . 3 -10) Ofc. Olsen stopped Mr. 
2 
Pendergrass based upon running the registration and seeing that 
the registered owner's license was suspended. (6/18/12 Tr. p 20 
Ll. 3-6) Ofc. Olson did not witness any traffic violations 
committed by the truck. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 20 Ll. 7-9) Ofc. Olson 
could not recall when he first saw Mr. Pendergrass' truck. 
(6/18/12 Tr. p. 20 Ll. 14-18) Ofc. Olson could not recall where 
he was when he ran the vehicle's registration and the driver's 
license of the vehicle's owner. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 21 Ll. 20-24) 
Ofc. Olson could not recall if he followed the truck or passed 
the truck when he saw it first. ( 6 / 18 / 12 Tr. p. 2 2 11. 6 - 9) 
Ofc. Olson could not recall if Mr. Pendergrass' truck was being 
driven when he first saw the truck. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 22 Ll. 12-
14) Ofc. Olson could not recall if he identified Mr. 
Pendergrass as the driver before he initiated the traffic stop. 
(6/18/12 Tr. p. 23 Ll. 1-5) Ofc. Olson did testify that he 
identified Mr. Pendergrass as the driver at the time he pulled 
him over. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 22Ll. 15-21) Ofc. Olson further 
testified when the two cars passed that he could identify Mr. 
Pendergrass as the driver. (6/18/12 Tr. p. 22Ll. 15-25) 
Mr. Pendergrass disputes the District Court's finding and 
the State's argument that the magistrate found in the Memorandum 
Order Regarding Motion to Suppress that Ofc. Olsen identified 
Mr. Pendergrass as the driver of the truck. (R. p. 120; 
Respondent's Brief p. 11; R. pp. 53-59) Further, if the 
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magistrate did find that Ofc. Olson identified Mr. Pendergrass 
prior to initiating the traffic stop that finding was not 
supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing as argued in 
the Appellant's Brief. The finding that Of c. Olson identified 
Mr. Pendergrass was not required by the magistrate's decision as 
analysis did not include the required Cerino analysis. 
The State argues that Mr. Pendergrass ignored the 
magistrate's finding and cites to the magistrate's Memorandum 
Order in support. (Respondent's Brief p. 11) The citation to 
which the State refers is to an earlier mention in the 
Memorandum Order that Ofc. Olsen "identified Pendergrass as the 
driver of that truck." Id. However, while that quotation does 
appear in the "Findings of Fact" section of the Memorandum Order 
it is a recitation of Ofc. Olsen testimony and is at odds with 
the magistrate's recitation of Mr. Pendergrass' contention. (R. 
p. 55) In the next sentence, the magistrate found that Ofc. 
Olsen testified that he "most likely" identified Pendergrass as 
the driver. (R. p. 55) Mr. Pendergrass asserts that this 
language in the Memorandum Order does not rise to the level of 
making a finding that Ofc. Olsen identified Mr. Pendergrass as 
they passed. The State seeks to examine these "Findings of 
Fact" and the Concluding paragraph together to determine that 
the magistrate properly found that Ofc. Olsen identified Mr. 
Pendergrass as the driver before initiating the traffic stop. 
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(Respondent's Brief p. 11; See aslo R. pp. 55, 59) However, 
taking the entire Memorandum Decision and Order together, Mr. 
Pendergrass asserts the magistrate did not make a conclusive 
finding that Ofc. Olson identified Mr. Pendergrass prior to the 
stop. 
The State asserts that the magistrate made a factual 
finding that Ofc. Olsen identified Mr. Pendergrass as the driver 
based upon a sentence in the analysis section. However, the 
State ignores contradictory items in the Memorandum Decision and 
Order. These include the next sentence in the findings of fact 
that Ofc. Olson "most likely" identified Mr. Pendergrass; the 
statement in the analysis that Ofc. Olsen "likely identified 
Pendergrass as the driver and promptly initiated a traffic 
. stop"; and that the conclusion lacks any discussion as to 
whether or not Mr. Pendergrass had been identified as the driver 
before the traffic stop was initiated. (R. p. 55; R. p. 59; R. 
p. 59) 
The magistrate does note in the analysis section of the 
Memorandum Decision and Order that "Olsen. .identified 
Pendergrass as the driver of the Toyota truck." ( R . pp . 5 7 - 5 8 ) 
However, the magistrate doesn't make an overt finding anywhere 
else that Ofc. Olsen did identify Mr. Pendergrass. The State 
may have been referencing this section of magistrate's 
Memorandum Decision and Order in its argument that Mr. 
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Pendergrass ignored the magistrate 1 s finding 1 but at the end of 
the Analysis section the magistrate again notes that Ofc. Olsen 
"likely identified" Pendergrass as the driver of the truck. (R. 
p. 59 1 Respondent 1 s brief p. 11 citing to R. pp. 55 1 59) 
Further, in the Conclusion of the Memorandum Decision and Order 
the magistrate found that because Ofc. Olsen learned that the 
truck "was registered to Pendergrass and that Pendergrass's 
driving privileges were suspended. Thus I there was a valid 
reason for the traffic stop." (R. p. 59) There is nothing in 
the Conclusion to support that the magistrate made a finding 
that the identification occurred prior to the stop or that the 
magistrate relied upon that finding if it was made. 
Ofc. Olsen did testify that he identified Mr. Pendergrass 
as the driver as they passed each other but in response to the 
next question indicated that he couldn't say if he had 
identified Mr. Pendergrass before. ( 6 / 18 / 12 Tr. p . 2 2 L. 15 
through p. 23 L. 4.) He could only give a most likely scenario. 
Id. It's clear from this exchange that Ofc. Olsen could not 
testify as to when he first identified Mr. Pendergrass. He 
testified that he identified Mr. Pendergrass but when asked if 
he had identified Mr. Pendergrass prior I Ofc. Olsen could not 
remember and again could only give a "most likely" response. 
(6/18/12 Tr. p. 23 Ll. 1-4) 
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III. CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the magistrate's decision, and 
the District Court's review, denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress, does not meet the constitutional standard set in State 
v. Cerino, because it does not contemplate whether the officer 
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Pendergrass was 
the driver prior to initiating the stop. Even if this court 
finds that the magistrate court did contemplate the 
identification as part of its decision, this court should hold 
the finding is clearly erroneous because it is not corroborated 
by Ofc. Olsen's testimony or the dashboard video. Ofc. Olsen 
could not testify with certainty how or when he identified Mr. 
Pendergrass, but could only of fer a "likely" scenario. Ofc. 
Olsen likely could not have identified Mr. Pendergrass with 
enough particularized suspicion, in the split second as their 
vehicles passed, to justify stopping him. As such, this Court 
should reverse the magistrate's denial of Mr. Pendergrass' 
Motion to Suppress and the District Court's affirmation of the 
magistrate's decision. 
Dated this 27 th day of November, 2013. 
Attorney for Appellant 
7 
IV. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on this 27th day of November, 2013, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, APPELANT' S 
REPLY BRIEF, to: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE ROOM 210 
BOISE IDAHO 83720 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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